

# SAFETY CORNER

CORPORATE AIR NEWSLETTER

NOVEMBER 2018

## NEXTGEN AVIATION SAFETY - STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

### THE SAFETY CARD

The Safety Card is played when data does not support an opinion of a decision maker or when safety is not comprehended. The Safety Card is when safety becomes the driving force of operations without considering Residual Risk, which is the remaining risk level that exists after all selected risk control techniques have been implemented or without considering the Substitute Risk, which is the safety risk level that exists of new hazards identified by the introduction of a risk control. The Safety Card is played when safety is not defined, measured or when operational pressure is applied from a third party or social media.



### PLAYING CARDS

Playing the playing-cards when making safety decisions is simple, since there is only one deck, no opposition and whatever card is picked is the card picked. Playing the safety card is opinion based safety where facts and data is excluded. Some might think flying is unsafe while other don't.


Leonardo da Vinci quote below says it well how a good Safety Management System (SMS) can be railroaded by opinion based decisions.

*“Anyone who conducts an argument by appealing to authority is not using his intelligence; he is just using his memory.”*



### DIRECTOR OF SAFETY

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#### ATC – PILOTS

ATC: Alitalia 321, continue taxi to the holding position 20R south via tango. Check for workers along taxiway. Alitalia 321: Roger, 20R via tango. Workers checked, all are working.

A DC-10 had come in a little hot and thus had an exceedingly long roll out after touching down. San Jose Tower: American 751, make a hard right turn at the end of the runway, if you are able. If you are not able, take the Guadalupe exit off Highway 101, make a right at the lights, and return to the airport.

### THE WORD "SAFETY" DOES NOT IMPROVE SAFETY

When applying this concept of a customer satisfaction based approach to safety there could be a conflict between the quality-level accepted by a customer and operational control. Opinions based demands from third-parties, customers, social media or an aviation authority could develop unintended hazards and affect safety decisions.

Several years ago, and long before SMS became regulated, or accepted as an essential part of operations, an operator developed a customer satisfaction based safety management system. The concept of this system was to measure the level of safety from the point of view of customer satisfaction and apply data-based decision tools to operational control. This system functioned for several years until it was decided to apply safety as the primary driving force into operations.

While customer satisfaction could be measured, analyzed and defined, the concept of safety could not easily be defined or comprehended. The Safety Card was equally applied to all aspects of operations without defining safety critical areas to measure. This opinion based decision to change a word from "customer" to "safety" caused a drift in operational control and drift of processes effectiveness.

Using the word "safety" to operations does not improve safety unless decisions are based on factual data.

### GUESS WHAT THEY HAVE PLANNED FOR YOU

*Remember; If you don't design your own Safety Management System plan, chances are you'll fall into someone else's plan. And guess what they have planned for you? Not much.*



### PROTECT SAFETY

When we are playing the Safety Card we think we are protecting safety from hazards. The safety card is to place safety itself behind a chain-link fence. However, when safety is protected we restrict what safety can do and unknown hazards escape to destroy their next victim.

### THIS MONTH IN HISTORY

#### CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 1713.

On November 15, 1987, at Denver Stapleton Airport, Continental Airlines Flight 1713 was scheduled to depart for Boise ID. The flight was delayed due to weather and that their position on the field was unknown to ATC. The snow was falling heavy and Flight 1713 was delayed for about 30 minutes. The airplane crashed just after rotation.

#### PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to have the airplane deiced a second time after a delay before takeoff that led to upper wing surface contamination and a loss of control during rapid takeoff rotation by the first officer. Contributing to the accident were the absence of regulatory or management controls governing operations by newly qualified flightcrew members and the confusion that existed between the flightcrew members and air traffic controllers that led to the delay in departure.



Find the six differences. Then do it again and see if you could find them faster the second time.