



# SAFETY CORNER

CORPORATE AIR NEWSLETTER

SEPTEMBER 2017

## NEXTGEN AVIATION SAFETY - STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS OF A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

### SAFETY POLICY

There is an expectation that the organization has a safety policy that is agreed to and approved by the accountable executive. An accountable executive is the person who is responsible for operations or activities authorized under the certificate and accountable for meeting the requirements of the regulations. Without accountability for meeting the regulatory requirements an airport or airline is applying a reactive safety management system where it becomes a simple task to point fingers at the last link in the chain of an accident. It takes initiative, effort and planning for accountability to be effective with proactive operations and includes all links in the chain of event.

### ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is the expectation of responsibility. The very specific reason for the accountable executive to approve and agree to the safety policy is to establish a safety management system where senior management accept accountability, which then trickles down to all personnel. Personnel do not have safety authority and authority to question safety unless this authority is given by senior management. Everybody talks safety, but very few actually know how to implement it. Safety is the analyses and “plan-do-check-act” of regular day-to-day processes. Definition of accountability is often incorrectly applied as the definition of responsibility. Although accountability and responsibility cannot be applied independently, or one without the other, they cannot be interchanged with each other. Responsibility is a description of authority, while accountability is operations of that task, or the action of carry out that task of authority. Accountability is the behavioral action as expected by responsibility.



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- Acceptable risk levels and monitoring safety performance is the responsibility of the operator.
- SMS is an additional layer of safety and parallel approach to operational processes.
- Situational Awareness is a Safety Critical Factor.



*"Everybody talks safety, but very few actually know how to implement it."*

**EVERYBODY TALKS SAFETY**

"Everybody talks safety, but very few actually know how to implement it." The difference between responsibly and accountability could be described as the responsibly and accountability of driving down a two-lane highway. Opposing traffic, going 60 MPH towards each other are only separate by an imaginary wall of a yellow line. This is not a logical separation of two vehicles approaching within just a few feet of each other at 120 MPH. If logic is applied to this scenario it could be categorized as an insane solution and not practical. However, when applying the variable of accountability into the equation it works. The driver's responsibly is to stay on the correct side of the yellow line remains with the drivers whether they are driving or not.

**THE SAFETY POLICY SETS THE BAR**

When the expectation of a safety management system is that the accountable executive has agreed to, and approved the safety policy, the airport, or airline, set the bar of where in the organization accountability is expected. With the accountable executive accepting responsibly for accountability it has been established that the bar is set at the senior management level. Accountability is a tool to identify hazards and operational practices, which if left unattended, could lead to an accident.



**THIS MONTH IN HISTORY**

Alaska Airlines Flight 1866 was a regularly scheduled flight from Anchorage to Seattle with intermediate stops. On September 4, 1971, the aircraft serving the flight crashed into a mountain in Haines Borough, near Juneau on approach for landing. The aircraft struck the eastern slope of a canyon in the Chilkat Range of the Tongass National Forest at 2500 FT. There were 111 fatalities.

**NTSB**

The NTSB stated in their report that the probable cause of the accident was "a display of misleading navigational information concerning the flight's progress along the localizer course which resulted in a premature descent below obstacle clearance altitude. The origin or nature of the misleading navigational information could not be determined. The Board further concludes that the crew did not use all available navigational aids to check the flight's progress along the localizer nor were these aids required to be used. The crew also did not perform the required audio identification of the pertinent navigational facilities.

**CORPORATE AIR SAFETY TRENDING**



*Accountability is defined by comprehension of hazard.*